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CLIMATE CHANGE: THE REAL THREAT TO
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW, WHY DELAWARE
MUST KEEP A WATCHFUL EYE ON THE CONTENT
OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE AIR
DAVID M. WILSON*
"The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist
expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails."
William Arthur Ward'
I. INTRODUCTION
Delaware is the corporate law capital of America.2 However, when
the blowing winds of change alter the environment in which it operates,
simply maintaining its bearing will not keep Delaware on course. This
article outlines the tactics Delaware must execute in a changing political
climate to successfully maintain its course as the leader in corporate law.
To understand these tactics one must first be familiar with Delaware's
current bearing and the environment in which it navigates by appreciating
the origins of Delaware's preeminence and the strengths of its system.
Equipped with this knowledge one will then be prepared to identify and
assess potential threats.
Section two of this article begins with a discussion of the history of
corporate law in America, the origins of Delaware's rise, and the
significance of Delaware's strengths. Next, section three outlines and
evaluates common views of Delaware's role in corporate law, including the
race theories of a race to the top or race to the bottom, and symbiotic
federalism. Then, section four discusses and dismisses several potential
threats to Delaware corporate law. Section five outlines Delaware's current
strategy to maintain its course of corporate law predominance. A casual
navigator of this article may choose to skip these initial sections, opting to
dive directly into the deep waters of the new and intriguing perfect storm
described in section six. However, even if one begins the voyage of this
article well prepared, aware of Woodrow Wilson's significance and able to
quote the works of Kahan and Rock, there is considerable foundational and
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'WILLIAM ARTHUR WARD, FOUNTAINS OF FAITH (Droke House 1970).
2 Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's
State in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 66 (2009).
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analytical benefit gained by investing a few moments to enjoy the familiar
concepts presented in these introductory sections. Such a reading will
ensure smooth passage through the final section with a more precise
understanding of the tactics Delaware must execute and the strategic
reasons underlying them.
II. RISE OF THE SMALL WONDER
A. Internal Affairs Doctrine (AD)
Delaware's continued corporate law preeminence is largely due to
the Internal Affairs Doctrine (LAD). The LAD prescribes that the law of the
state of incorporation govern a corporation's internal affairs, primarily the
decisions made by corporate leaders, and the fiduciary duties associated
with those decisions.3 Historically, this doctrine has been followed both
horizontally between states and vertically between individual states and the
federal government.4 However, recent developments have raised questions
as to whether states must follow the LAD as an absolute rule. The
Delaware Supreme Court was quick to answer those questions, invoking
not only longstanding historical precedence, but also the United States
Constitution.6 Although history appears to show that the law of the state of
incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation, throughout
corporate law history in America, the types of entities permitted to
incorporate has varied considerably.
B. History: Thank You Woodrow Wilson
In the beginning the luxury of incorporation was permitted only for
a specific purpose, such as infrastructure-based firms, and firms with real
assets, such as those in the railroad and telephone industries. Prior to
3 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc. 871 A.2d 1108, 1112-13
(Del. 2005); Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware's Vantagepoint: The Empire Strikes
Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. U.L. REV. 91, 93 (2008) (analyzing the
significance of this decision).
4 Glynn, supra note 3, at 93.
5See generally Examen, Inc. v. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 873 A.2d 318,
(Del. Ch. 2005) (Venture capital firm owning eighty three percent of a
corporation's preferred stock claimed California law applied, thus permitting
preferred stockholders to vote as a separate class. Corporation moved for judgment
on the pleadings. Under Delaware law and corporate charter all stockholders voted
as a single class, corporation was incorporated in Delaware and merger did not
implicate national policy to support exception to internal affairs doctrine).
6 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1113 (the authority of the
Delaware court's decision and the validity and significance of the IAD will be
discussed further in section four).
7 Dittman v. Distilling Co. of Am., 54 A. 570, 571 (N.J. Ch. 1903).
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1893, corporations had no authority to "purchase or hold the stock of other
corporations."8 New Jersey changed the tide when it introduced the idea of
allowing holding companies - companies whose assets may consist of
solely other companies - to incorporate.9 This catapulted New Jersey to
the forefront of corporate law in America. Holding companies across the
nation raced to the Garden State to incorporate. 0
Shortly after this shift, Delaware decided to similarly attract
corporate charters by changing its system to mirror that of the revolutionary
New Jersey model." However, by this point New Jersey had developed
significant network advantages. The value of the New Jersey system
increased exponentially with each additional firm that incorporated in New
Jersey. This substantial market power resulted in a barrier to entry for other
states, even if they mirrored the New Jersey system they were not New
Jersey.12
Then along came Woodrow Wilson. In 1910, Wilson was elected
governor of New Jersey, but he had bigger plans - presidential plans. As
governor, Wilson rapidly began his campaign for the presidency and, in an
effort to secure national popular support, he embarked on a crusade to
dismantle the New Jersey system that had led to its preeminence in
corporate law. Wilson proposed the "Seven Sisters," seven bills creating an
exceptionally broad antitrust system that went so far as to even forbid small
competing retail businesses from agreeing to close on Saturday afternoons
to spend more time with their families.'3 This crusade began to gather
national traction, and in 1913, shortly after Wilson's last speech as
governor, New Jersey enacted the Seven Sisters.14 A few months later in
the presidential election Wilson lost his home state of New Jersey;
however, largely due to his tactical enactment of the Seven Sisters he found
himself headed to the White House.' 5 In the wake of the Seven Sisters,
corporations suddenly began to evaluate their chartering decisions, and as
Wilson left New Jersey, so did the corporations. 6
8 Id. at 57 1.
9Id
1o Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1876-1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677, 679 (1989).
" E. Norman Veasey, Musings From the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7
DEL.L.REV 163, 166-67 (2004).
1 Id. at 67.
13 LYNN M. LOPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 6 (2005).
I4 id.
15 Id.
1 id.
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A Gladwellian analysis reveals that in 1913, Delaware, with its
legal system solidly established and firmly rooted in the ideas of the
original New Jersey model, was uniquely prepared for this opportunity."
At the very moment corporations were abandoning the sinking New Jersey
ship, the Delaware corporate law vessel was nestled safely across the inland
Delaware River.'8 With the New Jersey network economies eliminated by
the Wilson crusade and Delaware positioned and immediately ready to step
in, the small wonder acquired a valuable first mover advantage and the
corresponding network economies that followed as corporations began to
flood the banks of Wilmington.' 9 This shift in the corporate landscape has
continued through today, with the majority of corporations continuing to
choose to incorporate in Delaware.20
C. Strengths of the Delaware System
Because of the LAD, the strengths of the Delaware system are the
significant pillars underlying Delaware's sustained corporate law
leadership. These strengths include: the enabling Delaware corporate law
statute; a capable, stable, and efficient court system; the breadth of well-
developed common law; the specialized Delaware bar; and the client-
focused Division of Corporations. Also, as Mark Roe eloquently
articulated, there appears to be an implicit government guarantee in the
quality and stability of Delaware corporate law.2 ' Each of these strengths is
valuable to Delaware's current and future corporate law success.
7 See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS (2008)
(introducing the concept of 10,000 hours).
' id.
Prologue
TABLE . New Corporate Chancrs Issued
Year New Jerey Delaware
1884 232 -
1899 2,186 421
1903 2,035 746
1907 1.840 671
1911 1,856 1,342
1913 1,445 1.613
191 1,428 1,916
1918 1,272 2,460
Sourc*: Goorge bestw Eva Jr.,i,,nsb r Iampw
riew i. tbt United Statn 180&-1943 (New York: Nationl
Burma of Ecoamnue Rac*,th. 1948), 101, 26-27. Copy*
right 1948 by National Eurma of Economic Rewarc,
'9 LoPucki, supra note 13, at 7.20 id.
21 Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware's Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
75, 82 (2008).
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1. Enabling Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
The strength of the system begins with the enabling Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL). The DGCL is Delaware's flexible
enabling code that has remained consistent for over forty years.22 Although
the Delaware State Constitution is technically the formal authority for the
DGCL, there is only one relevant constitutional provision - the provision
requiring a super majority vote of both houses of the state legislature in
order to make any amendments to the DGCL.23  This guaranteed
constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority for any amendment is
unique to the DGCL, unlike any code in the state.24 Because of this
constitutional hurdle, statutory changes are generally slow and gradual - a
feature corporations tend to appreciate. Further, any additions to the code
generally originate from the Corporate Law Council of the Delaware bar
association.25 The researched suggestions of the council are then generally
adopted by the legislature.26 Further, the DGCL is an enabling statute in
that it provides broad guidelines, allowing details such as the duties of
corporate board members to be flushed out by the common law of the court
system.
The legislature does not micromanage the courts; rather it allows
them to develop a stable body of law; however, if significant mistakes do
occur in the creation of common law, the system is able to move swiftly to
correct any uncertainty. There are few examples of such mistakes. In fact
some argue that during "the modern era, there has been only one significant
instance."2 7  The legislature's ability to quickly address problems was
evidenced by the swift adoption of Section 102(b)(7), which mitigated the
sting of the Van Gorkom28 decision, by enabling corporations to adopt
22 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governace Issues, The
Policy Foundations ofDelaware Corporate Law, 106 CLMLR 1749, 1752 (2006).
23 DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
24 Chancellor William B. Chandler III, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Corporate
Board Members Lecture Series at Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University (Mar. 20, 2009).
25 Hamermesh, supra note 22 at 1753.26 Lawrence Hamermesh, How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expect
From Us in the Future, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 409, 410 (2007).
27 Marel Kahan & Edaward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1595-96 (2005) (explaining the
legislatures allowance of exculpatory provisions in response to uncertainty
introduced by the broadening of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkom. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
28 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858
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exculpatory provisions protecting decisionmakers from personal liability.2 9
Thus, the stable enabling DGCL strengthens the Delaware system.
2. Capable, Stable and Efficient Court System
Like the stable DGCL, Delaware's stable court system is one of its
significant strengths. Delaware's efficient court system is comprised of a
collaborative trial court (the Court of Chancery) and a supreme court."o
The Chancery is appointed in a non-political process, rather than being
elected.3' This process is further checked by a requirement of bi-partisan
representation amongst the judges, thus ensuring chancellors are beholden
only to the law and its efficient execution; they have no interest in
possessing a bully pulpit to espouse their beliefs to the citizens of
Delaware.3 2 Many states do not have a judiciary system structured in such
a non-partisan, disinterested fashion. When an official is elected, rather
than earning a position based on an objective assessment of qualifications,
one may argue that his or her incentives may differ from those of the
Delaware Chancery. Perhaps having a microphone might be useful if an
elected official must appeal to a populace base for regular re-election. The
non-partisan Delaware selection process ensures the Chancellor position is
held by the most capable individuals.
The non-partisan Chancery further adds to Delaware's strengths
through its collaborative climate. The Delaware Vice-Chancery is arguably
the only collaborative trial-court in America.33 This collaboration adds an
additional layer of consistency to the stable Delaware common law, and is
even evidenced in the process of selection for Delaware clerks.
The Delaware court system further provides for stable and efficient
results by requiring all corporate law issues to be heard by this specialized
non-partisan Court of Chancery, without juries or punitive damages, thus
minimizing emotional and uncertain outcomes. The ability of the
Chancery to act swiftly and precisely is nearly unmatched in the legal
world. If a corporation fails to hold an annual shareholder meeting as
required under DGCL §213, the efficient Court of Chancery will hold a
proceeding nearly immediately, generally within only a few days of the
violation.36 Further efficiency is visible in the Delaware appeal process.
29 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
30 Chandler, supra note 24.
3' DEL. CONST. art IV, §3.
32 Id.
33 Chandler, supra note 24.
34 Id. (discussing how clerkship applications are submitted to and reviewed by all
five vice chancellors).
Id.
36 id.
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Appeals of corporate law issues are heard directly by the Delaware
Supreme Court. This structure provides certainty by enabling rapid
resolution of corporate law issues. Thus Delaware's stable and efficient
court system further strengthens Delaware's corporate law preeminence.
3. Breadth of Well-Developed, Fact Intensive, Stable
Common Law
Delaware views the common law as a framework that outlines a
consistent structure for key issues, with the specific facts of those issues
viewed individually. This belief that "complex facts cannot and should not
be reduced to black letter codification" is a clear benefit to the Delaware
system.38 This structure enables the court to apply a stable set of rules to
difficult situations, many of which are fact-laden and by definition rooted in
equity. 39 Further, this attribute ensures the Delaware system cannot be
easily duplicated in other states by merely replicating a statute; the robust
body of common law generates lasting network advantages.
In contrast, states that follow the Model Business Corporation Act
have attempted for over twenty years to generate "a bright-line framework"
to assess the duties of directors.4 0 Delaware's rich and stable common law
distinguishes it from these rigid code jurisdictions, shielding it from the
dangers of the imperfect results that may be generated from such unbending
requirements.4
Although Delaware is exceptionally fast moving and efficient when
viewed from the perspective of an individual case, changes to the robust
common law occur at a conservative pace; doctrinal changes are generally
both slow and incremental.42 Established precedents remain consistent over
time, ensuring an environment that respects business' need for reliable
informed decisions, thus increasing certainty.4 Specifically, Delaware's
renowned "business judgment" rule has methodically evolved, reliably
providing a presumption in favor of directors' decisions." Bit by bit the
doctrine has matured, fleshing out the presumption that directors: are
37 Id.
38 Hamermesh, supra note 22, at 1777.
39 id.
40 id.
41 Id.
42 Chandler, supra note 24.
43 Omari Scott Simmons, Branding of the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance
and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 1129, 1158 (2008).
" Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp. 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1926); Aronson v.
Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
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disinterested, act in good faith, and with a rational business purpose, and
consider "all material facts reasonably available."45 This measured and
deliberate evolution ensures both fairness and equity are addressed without
disturbing the fine balance of certainty. Thus Delaware's well-developed
and stable common law further strengthens Delaware's corporate law
preeminence.
4. Specialized Bar and the "Saints and Sinners" of
Delaware Law
In addition to the network advantages of its robust common law,
Delaware's specialized bar is a further strength that sustains its
preeminence. The Delaware bar is comprised of a small group of members
who have successfully navigated a rigorous selection process.46 This small
community is tight-knit and as such, reputations are of the utmost
importance.47 Although the Court of Chancery may not have the authority
to hold counsel or business leaders responsible for all questionable
behavior, they are more than capable of dressing them down through their
own unique Delaware method, commonly referred to as the saints and
sinners of Delaware law.48 Through their opinions, Delaware chancellors
are able to enforce an overarching moral standard.49
A recent example of the saints and sinners method is found in
Chancellor William Chandler's Disney opinion.so In this meticulous and
ordered decision, although he found that none of the directors had breached
their fiduciary duties, Chandler took the time to make a public example of
many of the participants. 5' Specifically, Chancellor Chandler accurately
and eloquently described general counsel Litvack's testimony as
"pathetic."52 In the same opinion, Chandler paused to carefully describe the
actions of two participants as "a shameless public relations move."" These
types of public reprimands are unique tools enabling the Delaware chancery
to maintain certainty through the promotion of consistent behavior by the
Delaware corporate law community. The intimate nature of the Delaware
45 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 N. 66 (Del. 2000).
46 Chandler, supra note 24.
47 Id.
48 See generally, Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints
and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles (Mich. St. L. Rev., Working Paper No. 09-19,
2009) (describing the history and usage of the Saints and Sinners of Delaware
corporate law).
9 Id. at 13.
so See generally, In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del.
Ch. 2005).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 777.
3Id. at 726.
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bar, coupled with the ability of the chancery to enforce normative behavior,
are significant strengths that maintain Delaware's preeminence.
5. Client-Focused Delaware Division of Corporations
Delaware's system, beginning with the enabling DGCL, is filled
with unique strengths. The non- partisan Chancery system utilizes several
unique tools as it creates and interprets the robust Delaware common law
and enforces the enabling DGCL. The specialized bar further adds to this
efficient system. One often overlooked arrow in Delaware's quiver is the
client-focused Division of Corporations. This state agency efficiently
facilitates the incorporation process.S4 Like the efficient chancery courts
the division offers expedited service.ss The division's user-friendly online
system enables creation of a corporation in a matter of minutes. This
customer-focused efficiency rarely found in government bureaucracies
further adds to Delaware's preeminence.
D. Current Effect of Delaware's Preeminence
Delaware's many strengths have uniquely positioned this
geographically small state to reap large benefits. Today more than 850,000
businesses are legally domiciled in Delaware.57 This includes over 63% of
all Fortune 500 companies, and one-half of the companies listed on the
NYSE and NASDAQ! 5' Further, on an ongoing basis 75% of all initial
public offerings in the United States are incorporated in Delaware; this is
150,000 new incorporations annually.59 To look at it another way, over
97% of all United States companies are either incorporated in Delaware or
their home state.60
What does this massive domination of the corporate law market
mean for Delaware? The roughly $750-800 million generated every year
through corporate franchise fees accounts for approximately one-fourth of
the entire Delaware State budget.6 ' These revenues enable Delaware to
54 Division of Corporations - About Agency, State of Delaware,
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
5 Id.
s6One Stop Business Regulation and Licensing, State of Delaware,
https://onestop.delaware.gov/osbrlpublic/Home.jsp (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
"About Agency, supra note 54.
58 Id.
5 Chandler, supra note 24.
60 Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices ofIPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U.L REv. 1559,
1562 (2002).
61 Chandler, supra note 24.
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maintain its current structure of zero sales tax; yes, tax-free shopping is yet
another strength the small wonder has to offer.6 2 With such high stakes
involved it is easy to see why Delaware is committed to continually
improving its strengths; strengths that cannot truly be understood alone.
Although the individual components of a ship will sink if plunged into the
sea alone, when properly machined and assembled they enable a vessel to
weather even the most difficult storm. Here, when used together
Delaware's strengths enable smooth sailing across the most challenging
corporate law waters.
III. IMPOSING PYGMY OR SMALL WONDER?
Traditionally the law of the state of incorporation governs the
internal affairs of a business6 while the federal government provides a
layer of governance that primarily addresses external issues such as
disclosure and securities.M The consequences of this structure have
generated much scholarly discussion resulting in the evolution of multiple
views of the system. This section will explore both the highly debated race
views and the more recent view of symbiotic federalism. The purpose of
the following discussion is not to promote any individual view, rather to lay
a foundation for the discussion of potential threats found below in section
four.
A. Race View
The value of the corporate charter market is significant; it is
possible for a state to generate nearly one fourth of its entire annual budget
from these chartering fees alone. Since the authorization of holding
companies - which led to New Jersey's corporate dominance -
conversations have developed concerning the incentives these fees provide.
The question is whether the value of corporate charters incents states to
cater to the whims of corporate decisionmakers in an effort to attract
charters - the race to the bottom, or whether the incentive is to provide a
superior and more efficient corporate law product - the race to the top.66
1. Race to the Bottom
In 1974, William Cary wrote that Delaware is a "pygmy" that
"prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as
62 Id.
63 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
6 Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware's VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the
Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 93 (2008).
65 Chandler, supra note 24.
66 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 -94 (2005).
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an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders, thereby
increasing its revenue."67 Cary and others claim that Delaware's enabling
statute has led to the watering down of corporate law across America.68 As
Delaware endeavors to retain and attract corporations it holds strong to its
enabling statute.69 Why? Those who believe in this race would argue that
it is because, although a corporation may be owned by thousands of
shareholders, the decision of where to incorporate is made by a few select
executives and directors. In an effort to attract those key decisionmakers
and compete for the valuable charters directors control, many states have
duplicated much of the Delaware statute, thus diluting nearly all of
American corporate law.70
Cary suggests "there is no public policy left in Delaware corporate
law except the objective of raising revenue."7 This competition prompts
Delaware to ignore agency problems and lean even further toward "minimal
standards of director responsibility." 72 Corporate decisionmakers race to
states with legal systems that offer them, as individuals, little responsibility
and great protection. This race to the bottom compounds the issue of
separation of ownership and control, within organizations, exploiting
shareholders through the eradication of the "concept of fiduciary
responsibility and fairness."7 This logic has prompted some commentators
to call for various levels of federal intervention to combat this race. The
race to the top provides an alternate perspective.
2. Race to the Top
The "race to the top" position holds that state systems have not
devolved, ignoring basic shareholder protections and value; rather, just the
opposite has occurred. Delaware is the small wonder not only because of
the significant number of incorporations it holds relative to its geographical
size, but also because of the magnitude of the positive influence it has had
on the corporate law of America. The competition for corporate charters
67 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974).61Id. at 665.
69 Id.
70
7' Id. at 684.
7 2 Id. at 672.
7 Id.
74 Id. at 696.
75 Id. at 700-01 (arguing for minimum corporate law provisions applicable to all
corporations).
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has led to the evolution of stable and efficient corporate law across the
country. It has been a race to the top!76 Unlike the previous view, the race
to the top recognizes that in the competition for corporate charters states are
incentivized to create systems that encourage investors to invest, and
creditors to extend credit. Without such activities it is difficult, if not
impossible for an organization to succeed. Therefore, the race encourages
efficient corporate law that reduces operating costs and provides higher
returns to shareholders.77  Corporations that choose to reincorporate in
states such as Delaware do not reduce shareholder value - they increase
it.78
If the race were to the bottom, one would expect to find the worst of the
worst in the state that was arguably winning that race. Delaware should be
the home to every fraud-committing, regulation-skirting organization, but
this is simply not the case. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge aptly noted,
"the two main poster-children for reform, Enron and WorldCom, were not
Delaware corporations," rather they were incorporated in Oregon and
Georgia, respectively.79 The draw of Delaware is not the lawless Wild
West image promoted by some commentators.
If one were to assume the race is actually to the bottom, then it would
logically follow that if Delaware acted inconsistent with such a view then
the small wonder would see its dominance vanish. Again, this is simply not
the case. Even if Delaware chose to gradually decrease the protections it
provides to the decisions of directors, or increase the fiduciary duties of
corporate board members, these actions alone would not result in corporate
flight. They would be insufficient to overcome, or even neutralize,
Delaware's strengths and network advantages.
As discussed above, the value of the Delaware system is not merely its
law, rather an entire host of certainty-promoting strengths: the efficient,
competent, non-partisan judiciary; the highly skilled corporate bar; volumes
of rich clarifying common law; and the stable enabling DGCL. Each of
these strengths is bolstered by and adds to the network advantages
generated from the significant number of Delaware corporations. These
strengths cannot be erased merely by adjustments to the legal rules, so long
as the certainty they provide remains. If changes are made deliberately, and
are reflected consistently through the entire Delaware system, then the
76 Judge Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems,
6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 128 (1982).
7 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265 (1985).
78 Id. at 272.
7 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Remarks on Say On Pay: An Unjustified Incursion On
Director Authority 5-6 (UCLA Law & Economics Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 09-06, 2008).
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small wonder will maintain its corporate law primacy. The ability of
directors to make decisions with an awareness of the effects of those
decisions is the true benefit, not merely a body of law that may on its
surface have a reputation of leniency. The Delaware structure promotes
this required certainty. Therefore additional federal intervention is
unnecessary, and may actually lead to uncertainty and lower returns for
shareholders.o
B. Symbiotic Federalism
A more recent approach promoted by Marcel Kahan and Edward
Rock suggests that the Delaware system is not necessarily driven by the
pressures of a race to the top or bottom; rather it evolves through a
symbiotic relationship with the federal government.8 1 Both the federal
government and Delaware benefit from this relationship. Delaware is not
forced to pour resources into a massive regulatory agency to monitor issues
like securities trading, and the federal government benefits from Delaware's
nimble ability to respond to new developments and its capacity to create
and apply superior rules than those likely to emerge from a federal
bureaucracy.82 Symbiotic federalism does not mean that "Delaware
behaves as if it were an instrument of the federal authorities."83 Nor does it
imply that an individual state has the ability to control Congress.84
Symbiotic federalism recognizes the possibility of federal preemption;
however, this will only occur if a populist groundswell forces the federal
government to abandon this mutually beneficial relationship with
Delaware.85
One recent example of this symbiotic relationship is found in the
2008 Bear Stearns shareholder litigation. Delaware, recognizing the
scope of the matter before it, allowed the federal government to handle an
issue that would likely tarnish the reputation of the Delaware system in the
eyes of the general public and those in Washington. However, this case,
80 Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 919-20
(1982).
81 See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 27.82 Id. at 1576, 1587.
83 Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for
Corporate Governance? 21 OxFORD REV. EcoN. POL. 212, 223 (2005).
8 Id.
85 Kahan & Rock, supra note 27, at 1576.
86 In re Bear Steams Cas. S'holder Litig, No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46
(Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008).87Id.
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and others like it, highlights the "chicken or egg" weakness of the notion of
symbiotic federalism. One scholar has commented that state law exists
merely at the whim of federal authorities, asserting that Congress and
federal agencies are the true masters behind corporate law."8 When federal
authorities act, it is because they dislike a state law; when they do not act, it
is merely because they "tolerate" a state law.89 Regardless of one's own
beliefs, one thing is clear - there is a fine line between a symbiotic and
subservient relationship.
IV. POTENTIAL PERIL
The traditional conversations of a race to the top or bottom fail to
address the true threat to Delaware corporate law. The notion of symbiotic
federalism begins to raise valuable issues; however, it too falls short of a
complete description of the potential peril on the horizon for Delaware.
The issue is not simply whether corporations will leave Delaware for
smoother waters in states like Pennsylvania; nor is it whether the Congress
will introduce a federal chartering system, or even whether the federal
government will gradually preempt Delaware law through incremental
changes to the corporate law landscape. Like much in life and law, this
issue is complex. It involves a combination of the above and an intricate
social component that was only briefly described by Kahan and Rock.
A. Horizontal Threats
Horizontal threats to Delaware's corporate law preeminence exist
in two forms: race and jurisdictional." Race threats include the idea that
Delaware corporate law generates either a race to the top, or a dangerous
race to the bottom for the entire nation. While the more recent
jurisdictional threats involve strategic maneuvers by select individual states.
Each threat presents its own challenges.
1. Race Horizontal Threats
Those who promote the race to the bottom argue that Delaware
battles a constant threat from competing states. As those states duplicate
the enabling DGCL and further modify their statutes to offer even greater
protections to corporate decision-makers, Delaware must also evolve or face
certain loss of its valuable corporate charters. However, another argument
could be made that this is simply not the case. Corporations will not flee
Delaware any faster than users abandon Microsoft or Apple when an
88 Mark Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003).89 id.
90 Cary, supra note 67, at 665-66 (describing the horizontal race threat); Stevelman,
supra note 2, at 96-97 (describing the horizontal jurisdiction threat).
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unknown startup rolls out a shiny new operating system. Why? The
answer to that question is twofold: network advantages and certainty.
The very network advantages that prohibited Delaware from
surpassing New Jersey in the early 1900s now work to maintain Delaware's
position. As the New Jersey system held strong, until it was sabotaged
from within, Delaware will maintain its position without the need to
aggressively produce shiny new law.
The certainty concept requires a bit more discussion. On the
surface it may sound unconventional, but human beings are comfortable
with risk. With risk we are able to quantify possible outcomes and make
decisions based on our risk tolerance levels. The amount of risk an
individual or organization may tolerate varies dramatically. But within
those levels we are comfortable with risk.
Uncertainty is something "radically distinct" from this "familiar
notion of risk."9' Uncertainty is non-quantitative, and cannot be measured;
as such, it cannot be properly hedged.9 2 In order to make effective and
efficient decisions, corporate leaders must know with some degree of
certainty what rules will govern their actions. When incorporators select a
state, they enter into an implicit contract with shareholders and contracting
parties that the law of that state will govern their internal affairs.
The feature of predictable outcomes, whatever those outcomes may
be, is a distinct benefit that provides business leaders an opportunity to
weigh their decisions or possibly even structure "commercial transactions
to avoid litigation altogether." 93 Because of these decisionmaking needs,
organizations largely select their state of incorporation with a distinct focus
on certainty. 94 Even if another state is able to duplicate the enabling DGCL
and provide superior service through its administrative agency, it is
impossible to duplicate the robust common law that Delaware has
developed over the past century. This common law and the entire structure
of the Delaware system provide the certainty that both decisionmakers and
shareholders require.
91 FRANK KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19 (The Riverside Press
Cambridge 1921); see generally Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty (UC Berkeley
Public Law Research Paper No. 1555343, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstractid=1555343 (providing in depth analysis of
uncertainty).
92 See Knight, supra note 91, at 20.
93 Fischel, supra note 80, at 942.
94 Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for
Corporate Governance, 21 OxFORD REV. ECON. POL. 212, 219 (2005).
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2. Jurisdictional Horizontal Threats
In section two we briefly explored the Internal Affairs Doctrine
(LAD), and suggested that recent developments raised questions as to
whether states must follow this doctrine as an absolute rule. 95 Delaware's
legitimacy rests in its strengths and the broad authority it derives through
the LAD. Thus, certainty of the internal affairs doctrine is critical to
Delaware's continued preeminence. Although the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) contains an explicit provision providing that the
state where litigation is brought cannot apply its own law to the internal
affairs of the corporation (rather it must apply the laws of the domicile
state),96 the jurisdictional horizontal threat still remains. Both California
and New York have enacted statutes disavowing part of the internal affairs
doctrine. This encroachment poses some danger to Delaware. If the
underlying certainty of what law shall govern the internal fairs is eroded,
then corporations will have less incentive to continue to incorporate in
Delaware.
In VantagePoint Delaware quickly stepped in to prevent any
erosion of the IAD, citing both the long standing IAD and the United States
Constitution.98 Whether or not this assertion will be sufficient to weather
the test of time has yet to be determined. 99 However one thing is clear, the
federal government, specifically Congress through their powers granted
under the Commerce Clause, may step in at nearly any moment, either
grasping the helm and turning the ship completely, or simply selecting a
new bearing and ordering the captain to adjust course.
9 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
96 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (2002).
97 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (2001) (requiring that if a foreign corporation earns
more than fifty percent of its revenue within California, then it shall be governed
by California law); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1317-20 (McKinney 2002) (stating that
directors of foreign corporations doing business in New York are subject to New
York law "to the same extent as directors and officers of a domestic corporation").
9 Vantage Point Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1113 (discussing the Due
Process clause: "The internal affairs doctrine is not, however, only a conflicts of
law principle. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
directors and officers of corporations "have a significant right ... to know what
law will be applied to their actions").
99 Vantagepoint and a few commentators have recognized this threat; see generally
Glynn, supra note 64; Donald C. Langevoort, Federalism in Corporate/Securities
Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, and State Regulation ofInsider
Trading, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 879 (2006).
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B. Vertical Threats
Much like horizontal threats, vertical threats are visible in multiple
forms. Delaware must be aware of the possibilities of both preemption
through a comprehensive federal chartering system and the more dangerous
threat of gradual federal preemption.
1. Comprehensive Federal Chartering System
Delaware largely owes its preeminence to the powers it is able to
execute through the internal affairs doctrine. The question is whether the
federal government must abide by this essential doctrine? Is Congress
required to heed the [AD? The short answer is, no! Congress has the
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.'00 If one questions
whether Congress could step in, they need only look to the Supreme
Court's decisions in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., and Wickard v. Filburn.'1 The Court has held that "[a]lthough
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens
and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control." 0 2 This broad congressional power was again expanded in 1942
when the Court further held that even if the individual effects of an activity
are not substantial, the activity should be judged by its aggregate national
effects when considering whether Congress's authority should be
extended. 0 3 Therefore, Congress may create a federal chartering system,
essentially sweeping the proverbial rug from under Delaware.
However, although the threat exists that Congress could shake all
of corporate law like one giant etch-a-sketch, erasing Delaware in the
process, in a normal environment, this would never occur. The issue of
whether the representatives would be able to retain their seats in the
following election slows the vigor of even the most aggressive legislators.
Even Professor William Cary, in his initial declaration of the race to the
bottom, argued that such a giant leap by the federal government was not the
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3; see also generally Federal Chartering of
Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO.L.J. 123 (1972) (analyzing the
Constitutionality of a federal charter system).
101 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10 2 Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
103 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129.
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necessary solution, nor was it likely even possible.'0 But, Professor Cary
and others have suggested the need and possibility of some federal
standards.'os
2. Gradual Preemption
Cary and others have argued for systems where companies are free
to incorporate in the state of their choice, but are subject to federal
jurisdiction for certain blanket requirements.'06 As Cary noted, although
companies will remain free to select their state of incorporation, it is likely
that the federal standards will "remove much of the incentive to organize in
Delaware."' 07 Although such a system has never been formally proposed,
today, inch by inch, the federal government is stepping in and occupying
some of the space that Delaware operates. This is visible through: SEC
regulations, exchange listing rules, and the occasional incursion into the
sacred realm of fiduciary duties.
As these changes occur, one might believe that Delaware would
embrace the extra hands on deck. As such a truly small wonder, one may
imagine that it would confront many logistical challenges in the face of
issues like regulatory enforcement. Such seemingly helpful federal
assistance is exactly what the notion of symbiotic federalism rationalizes.' 08
This encroachment allows Delaware to nimbly focus on what it does best
- responding to new developments through the creation and efficient
application of exceptional common law rules - thus promoting the
certainty that a massive federal bureaucracy could arguably never
provide.'09
However, with each step the federal government takes, Delaware's
marginal corporate utility is diminished. The passage of the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, commonly
referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) brought a new wave
of gradual preemption.to No longer may companies decide whether to
provide loans to their dedicated officers; this decision has been made by the
government - and the answer is no.' What does this mean for Delaware?
The result does not change simply because the rug is being pulled slower.
Corporations now have less incentive to reincorporate in Delaware.
104 Cary, supra note 67, at 701.
osId, at 700-02.
"Id at 702.
o07Id.
o0 Kahan & Rock, supra note 27, at 1587.
" Id. at 1576, 1587.
"o Stevelman, supra note 2, at 90-91 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745).
"' Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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Eventually, the space that Delaware occupies will be so small that any
remaining network advantages will be rendered inert.
Further, stock exchanges serve a significant role as a "de facto
branch of the federal government" in a regulatory sense.1 2 Through their
listing requirements, these private entities impose multiple governance
standards." 3 One may ask how the listing requirements of private entities
relate to the federal government, and vertical threats to Delaware. The
logic is clear; since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress and
the SEC have dramatically increased their role in regulation.
Is this what is actually happening? Is the federal government
vigorously tugging on Delaware's rug? No. Since the introduction of the
largely accounting based reforms of SOX, the federal government has
politely declined to sully its hands with the meat of corporate law. Some
of the boldest moves occurred only after the global economic crisis of 2008,
and those efforts largely amounted to an advisory executive say-on-pay
initiative." 4 As of today, nearly two years after the September 15, 2008,
crash of Lehman Brothers, even this advisory, watered-down attempt at
governance has yet to pass both houses of Congress.
In the aftermath of the global crisis one may have expected gradual,
or even significant, federal preemption in the areas of fiduciary duties,
executive compensation, proxy access, or perhaps even a rule forbidding
chief executive officers from also simultaneously serving as the chairman
of the board,"'5 but this was not the case. For all the discussion of 2009, the
year barely saw the SEC amend a rule related to broker-director
elections."'6 The House managed to pass H.R. 4173 during the year;'
however this so-called "Consumer Protection Act of 2009" barely includes
say-on-pay language and as of early 2010, it is still languishing in the
Senate, its ultimate fate uncertain. If this is an example of congressional
112 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Delaware's Competition, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE.COM,
THE VOCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL JOURNAL OF A CORPORATE LAW PROFESSOR,
Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2009/11 /delawares-competition.html (last visited Jan 28, 2010).
u3 id.
114 Id. (discussing the possible requirement of an advisory shareholder vote on
executive compensation).
" Posting of Francis H. Byrd, Looking Ahead at 2010 by Looking Back at 2009 to
the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/17/looking-ahead-at-
2010-by-looking-back-at-2009/#more-6306 (Jan. 17, 2010, 8:29 EST) (discussing
NYSE Rule 452).1 16 id.
117Id.
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tugging, it is clear that there is limited threat of marginalization. The rug is
firmly under Delaware and the small wonder's network strengths alone are
sufficient to weather such a diminutive storm.
V. CURRENT COURSE, HOLD THE BEARING
The small wonder is an oak; sturdy and stable. If one closes their
eyes and imagines an oak tree, it is unlikely that images of tiny saplings
appear; rather the mind is flooded with vivid pictures of a strong and
enduring tree, steadily growing, strengthening its mighty trunk, and ever
deepening its massive roots. The oak does not sporadically shift left and
right like an ivy planning its growth based upon the wind and weather of
the day. The oak weathers storms and adjusts its course only gradually and
over time. Similarly, as Delaware navigates the corporate law sea, it does
so in its sturdy vessel, buttressed by its many strengths: the enabling
DGCL; its capable, stable, and efficient court system; its breadth of robust
common law; the specialized bar; and its client focused Division of
Corporations.
Delaware charted its course while New Jersey dominated the
market. The small wonder reached its current prominence only after New
Jersey faltered by dramatically changing its system. Since its rise following
Woodrow Wilson's actions in the early 1900's, Delaware has apparently
learned from the lessons of its neighbor. Changes to the enabling DGCL
have been incremental.'18 Delaware rarely adjusts its course; regardless of
the storm, it firmly maintains its bearing.
The extent of Delaware's adjustments is merely minor course
corrections along the original bearing. In 2006 Delaware amended the
DGCL to clarify that companies could, but were not required to, adopt non-
staggered boards." 9 In 2008, the Delaware Corporate Law Council began
to discuss possible additions to the slow changing and stable DGCL.' 20 In
2009, Delaware clarified that its law permits shareholders the right to proxy
access.12' These small changes indicate that the Corporate Law Council
appears to recognize that the environment is changing and some
adjustments must be made to maintain their current course of corporate
preeminence. Although Delaware has made a few bold stands,122 the
outward appearance is that adjustments will continue to be made in a
fashion similar to that of the past half century, with only minor gradual
changes to the DGCL coupled with rapid and precise acts by the Court of
" Kahan & Rock, supra note 27, at 1576.
" Chandler, supra note 24.
120 id
121 H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Del. 2009).
122 See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1108.
2010 Climate Change: The Real Threat to Delaware Corporate 501
Law, Why Delaware Must Keep a Watchful Eye on the
Content of Political Change in the Air
Chancery. The question is, when seas are rough will small corrections in
speed and direction be sufficient to maintain the course?
VI. THE PERFECT STORM
"Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm."1 23 Delaware's
network strengths effectively shield it from most horizontal threats, and the
potential political dangers of preemption generally keep the rug squarely
under Delaware's feet. The real threat is the development and arrival of a
perfect storm: a tipping point. 124 The threat is similar to the notion of
awakening a sleeping giant; it involves the awakening of the populace. The
threat is contingent upon the existence of an environment where Congress
can act without concern for re-election. Such an environment could result
in partial or even full preemption of the Delaware corporate law. This
concept of the perfect storm is something distinct from that which has
previously been discussed. Although symbiotic federalism briefly touches
on the issue, even Professor Cary left the door open to total federal
preemption "in the event of catastrophic depression or corporate debacle."
125
Delaware is a "pygmy among the 50 states."l 26 As symbiotic
federalism suggests, potential populist outcry is of particular concern to
Delaware largely because of its "pygmy" status.127 Nationally, Delaware
ranks second to last in size.'28 The small wonder manages to dwarf only
Rhode Island, and when considering that it edges out the Ocean State by
less than 1,000 square miles, perhaps "dwarf' is a generous description.129
Further, when evaluated by population, Delaware is again found wanting. 130
The corporate law giant has a community only slightly larger than that of
Washington D.C., a district that fails to merit congressional voting
representation. 131 Why should such a tiny state dictate the corporate law for
all of America? This idea is key to the populace awakening required for the
perfect storm.
123 JAMES SCHAFFER, THEY KNEW THEN, CHARACTER, LOVE, MONEY, LEADERSHIP,
AND OTHER SAGE ADVICE, 300 BC-1 500 AD 3 (2009) (quoting Pubilius).
124 See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
125 Cary, supra note 67, at 701.
126 Id.
127 Kahan & Rock, supra note 27, at 1576.
128 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/10000.html (last visited Jan 28, 2010).
129 id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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Over three decades have passed since William Cary first raised the
pitchforks against Delaware, and half of a decade has elapsed since Kahan
and Rock proposed that it would require a crisis to truly threaten Delaware.
However, during the last thirty-six years America has experienced several
crises. We have seen corporate fraud and scandal, the collapse of entire
industries, skyrocketing and then plummeting interest rates, inflation and
deflation, impeachment of presidents, 32 and our nation has gone to war and
war has come to our doorstep. At the very moment Kahan and Rock were
writing their thesis, the mortgage crisis was brewing. Now today, as the
dust settles from the fall of giants like Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, and
the 378 other major lenders that have failed since late 2006;3 as we
attempt to fill the massive economic hole in our economy where General
Motors once was; and as Americans try to regain their faith after being
jaded by the perceived injustice of outrageous executive bonuses and the
horror that our system permitted Bernard Madoff to command his ponzi
scheme virtually unnoticed by authorities, we must ask: why is Delaware
still here? If global economic collapse is not sufficient to sink the small
wonder, what is?
Although crisis may be necessary, history proves that it is not
sufficient. Delaware's strength is not a single competency, rather the
collection and interrelation of all its competencies. Likewise, the real threat
to Delaware must not be identified in a vacuum. The perfect storm is
visible only by considering the aggregate ground gained by all Delaware's
threats. The proper image of the perfect storm is not that of a rug being
pulled from under the small wonder; rather, it is that of Delaware fighting
to defend a sacred island. Although the small wonder maintains several
fortified positions, assaults are being mounted on multiple beachheads.
This scenario is sufficient to sink even the mighty Delaware.
As this article is being drafted, Congress is discussing the
requirement of a mandatory board-level risk committee' 34 and the
prohibition of CEO board chairmen,135 which goes further than the current
debate occurring in the Delaware Corporate Law Council. Both New York
and California are positioning themselves to alter the internal affairs
paradigm forever,13 and dozens of other states have positioned themselves
132 More precisely only one president was impeached during this time period,
President Nixon resigned prior to impeachment in 1974.
1 The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, http://ml-implode.com/ (last visited
Jan 28, 2010).
134 Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5(e)(5) (1st
Sess. 2009).
135 Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. § 16A(d)(2)
(1st Sess. 2009).
36 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2010); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1317-20
(McKinney 2009); See also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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to pick up the pieces should a tipping point be reached. Whether such a
perfect storm will be fully realized in the near-term is uncertain; however,
the signs of a possible storm are clearly present. Delaware must be alert
and mind the signs of such a storm; it must heed the warnings of its
sentries. The small wonder must be prepared for more than that suggested
by previous commentators. It must be prepared for both horizontal and
vertical threats, and it must stand vigilant against both gradual and complete
preemption. "Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm," 37 but what
should be done when the waves crash down from every direction?
VII. CONCLUSION: How To NAVIGATE THE WATERS WHEN
POLITICAL CHANGE IS IN THE AIR
This is an interesting, yet not entirely unique, era. As it has in the
past, America is experiencing both substantial crisis and scandal. However
today there is a high probability of the often elusive third element of the
perfect storm. It appears there may have been an awakening, or at least a
stirring, of the populace. In such an environment Delaware's network
advantages and minor adjustments along its original bearing may not be
sufficient to maintain its preeminence. The keys to successfully navigating
the corporate law waters during a perfect storm are three fold: (1)
identifying the storm, (2) assessing the environment, and (3) selecting and
following the proper bearing. The previous section defined a perfect storm,
the following paragraphs will discuss the significance of identifying such a
storm, and then the remaining pages will outline a suggested framework for
Delaware to follow while navigating this perfect storm.
A. Identify the Storm
Delaware's ability to recognize the difference between the "burning
platforms"' 3 8 ignited by crisis, scandal, and a changing political climate,
137 Schaffer, supra note 123, at 3.
138 Ken Embley, The Burning Platform, POLICY PERSPECTIVES, Mar. 29, 2005,
http://www.imakenews.com/cppa/e article000368179.cfm?x=bI 1,0,w (explaining
the term "burning platform" refers to tales of decisions made by oil rig workers on
a platform in the North Sea. After an explosion their rig burst into flames and
workers were confronted with the decision of staying on the flaming rig, or
attempting the hundred foot leap into the freezing waters below. The story is that
those who survived were the ones who recognized the difference between normal
rig problems that could be corrected and a true "burning platform," and thus
avoided certain death by making the leap. The often used quote in the business
world referring to this concept is that, "probable death is better than certain
death.").
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and the normal squabbles of business is essential to its future success. Rick
Wagoner, the former CEO of General Motors, failed to recognize the
burning platform. Less than two years before he was forced out of his
position by the federal government he calmly stated, "our sales and
marketing strategy requires patience but its working, and we need to stick
with it."l 3 9 Today he is gone. This sort of naive approach will certainly
lead to disaster in a perfect storm. It is not the opinion of this author that
Delaware fails to recognize the existence of a problem. In fact, Delaware
has already begun to take small steps toward showing the world its
awareness of a problem and its intended plan. However, these steps
indicate the recognition of a problem, not the recognition of a perfect storm.
The Delaware system is comprised of humans, although highly skilled and
dedicated, from time to time it is essential for these individuals to genuinely
examine Delaware with the courage to recognize, rather than rationalize,
that what may have first presented itself as merely a problem, may now
actually be a perfect storm.
B. Assess the Environment
Assessing the environment is more than identifying the storm.
Assessing the environment requires a realistic analysis of not only the
current environment in which Delaware operates, but also an analysis of its
capabilities. Generally, Delaware's strengths (discussed in section two) 14 0
are more than sufficient to fend off any individual assault, or even a
combination of small assaults. However as we have identified, in a perfect
storm Delaware will find itself protecting an island from assaults on nearly
every beachhead. Delaware must acknowledge that, with its current
strengths, in a perfect storm it cannot successfully defend every beachhead.
This assessment of environment and capabilities leads to the decision to
select a new bearing.
One commentator argues that the most significant threat to
Delaware's corporate law preeminence would be for the Chancery to
"attempt to gain complete control over the adjudication of Delaware
corporate law cases."l 4 1 Although her argument is fairly well reasoned, it
does not account for the perfect storm. I agree that "hubris is
dangerous."l 4 2 What is suggested below is not hubris, or arrogance, rather
merely recognition of the current corporate law environment followed
closely by a series of consistent deliberate actions.
139 Robert Farago, GM Death Watch 120: Definition ofInsanity, GENERAL
WATCH: GM SHAREHOLDERS WATCHING GENERAL MOTORS, Apr. 29, 2007,
http://www.generalwatch.com/editorials/editor ial.cfm?EdID=.
140 See supra notes 21-56 and accompanying text.
141 Stevelman, supra note 2, at 137.
142 Id.
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C. Select and Follow the Proper Bearing
Delaware's new bearing (tactics) need not be bold. The bearing
may, and arguably should, be consistent with Delaware's original course
(strategy). The issue in a perfect storm is not necessarily that the strategy is
flawed, rather that the tactics are no longer effective. The small wonder's
new bearing must leverage its existing strengths while identifying and
executing "asymmetric"l 43 tactics. Delaware must identify technology or
resources that it may utilize to alter the environment in a perfect storm.
One potential asymmetry that Delaware must consider when
selecting its bearing is the people of America. If a perfect storm exists, it is
because the third element is present - the people are fed up! If neglected,
this fact may permit the federal government to engage in activities that
otherwise would not occur. As voters become restless, they may tolerate or
even demand legislation that, if previously enacted, would have resulted in
the defeat of many incumbent legislators. However if properly positioned,
Delaware may leverage the people of America as an asymmetric strength
by embracing this asymmetry. If people are fed up, and that anger is
directed at an external threat, such as Congress rather than Delaware, the
passions of the people will then work to keep Delaware afloat, rather than
to sink it.
Change requires a compelling vision for the future and a process to
effect that change. However as mentioned above, the new bearing need not
be bold. Delaware need not, and should not, abandon its many strengths
that provide the certainty needed by businesses and shareholders. Here the
key agent of change is the Court of Chancery. Due to the Chancery's non-
partisan structure and nimble ability to shape the robust common law, it is
an invaluable asset. In a perfect storm, Delaware's future is in the hands of
its five capable Vice Chancellors. While on the front line, these men must
continue to provide clarity and vision in the words of their opinions. They
must take time to articulate not only the status of the law, but also clearly
articulate the policy reasons surrounding such law, thus ensuring there is no
confusion among shareholders, business leaders, and all Americans that the
small wonder is doing no evil; rather, it is aggressively promoting certainty
and security.
143 Asymmetric tactics are maneuvers which leverage strategy or uncommon
technology and resources to offset one's weaknesses or neutralize the strengths of
the opposing force, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY MARINE CORPS
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 109 (2007) (describing asymmetric tactics
used in Ireland).
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A perfect storm is not the time for sporadic minor adjustments, but
a time for a swift demonstration of resolve. This resolve need not come
through inconsistent changes to the common law that may result in
uncertainty. Although appropriate changes should be considered, the
immediate focus of the chancellors must include the increased utilization of
public praising and shaming of directors, management, and counsel. This
seemingly innocuous tool may be the secret to solving the Gordian knot.
This is not accomplished by using their position as a bully pulpit for
individual gain, but through clear articulation of the motives and rationale
of the court, thus promoting transparency. Through this use of the sinners
and saints of Delaware law, the chancellors can ensure that if America is
fed up, the result is an asymmetric strength rather than weakness. Delaware
is not an enemy of America; rather, it remains a consistent beacon of
certainty, efficiency, and fairness.
When selecting its bearing (tactics), in addition to an increased
employment of the sinners and saints, Delaware should increase its
emphasis on wisely selecting the ground upon which it fights. With
assaults on every beachhead, in the short-run it may be beneficial, even
required, to focus its efforts on the ground it must not lose rather than
defending every fortification. Just as the small wonder wisely chose to
defer to the federal courts in the Bear Stearns shareholder litigation,'" the
chancery will need to make several more decisive tactical decisions during
a perfect storm.
These decisions may even involve issues as significant as a vertical
threat to the Internal Affairs Doctrine. Although the LAD is well cited,
there is clear doubt as to whether the federal government will continue to
follow it in a perfect storm. The safest course is to know when to pick
one's battles. This emphasizes the delicate line these five chancellors must
navigate. When determining whether or not to yield to federal litigation,
the decisions these chancellors must make could determine the fate of
corporate law in the future.
The current chancellors have displayed great skill and commitment
to highlighting the strengths and efficiency of the Delaware system. Vice
Chancellor Strine showcased both his and the Delaware court system's
superior legal aptitude while outperforming New York's Federal Judge
Conn in recent litigation.145 However, in a perfect storm these exhibitions
of judicial mastery may harm the small wonder. In a perfect storm, the
chancellors must be willing to consider the possible employment of
alternate tactics. They must be willing to decisively follow the example set
by Chancellor Parsons in Bear Stearns,'" where he astutely recognized the
'" Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46.
145 In re Topps Co. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007).
'" Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46.
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dangerously fine line and wisely chose to decline the battle. When the case
is sitting before them, and it will, their resolve will be tested. It is up to
these five men to recognize that the best decision may not always be to
showcase one's superior efficiency, but the best decision may be to allow
the other side to take the beach, and expend their resources defending it.
Once the storm has been identified, the environment assessed, and
the bearing selected, it must be followed - the tactics must be executed.
Delaware must ensure both that the plan is carried out, and that it
simultaneously keeps a watchful eye open, ready to identify the next perfect
storm.
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